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While PacifiCorp appreciated the Commission's recognition that additional obsolescence 
needed to be removed from the Bureau's HCLD cost approach, it believed the magnitude of the 
Commission's adjustment was still inadequate and appealed to the district court for de novo 
review. R. 00061 ,; 35. 
The district court conducted a five day trial during which it "had the special opportunity of 
listening to each witness as he gave live testimony and was subjected to rigorous cross 
examination." R. 00062'; 37. 
PacifiCorp relied primarily on the expert testimony of Thomas K. Tegarden, a "respected 
expert in valuation methodology with 40 years of experience in valuing electric utility operating 
properties.,,2 R. 00061 ,; 36. 
After receiving and weighing all the evidence, the district court, concluded that 
PacifiCorp's book depreciation was "not calculated for the purposes of estimating the true 
difference between original cost and current market value" and that it did "not account for all 
forms of functional and external obsolescence that may affect [the value of the] electric utility's 
assets." R. 00060'; 30. A copy of the district court's Memorandum of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is attached as Addendum 1. 
2 PacifiCorp also called two additional witnesses who had considerable experience in the areas of 
utility regulation and valuation: (1) Mr. Steven R. McDougal, PacifiCorp's Director of Revenue 
Requirement, who had more than 26 years of electric utility regulatory expertise, and (2) Mr. 
Norman K. Ross, PacifiCorp's Director of Tax, who is a CPA, holds an ABV designation 
(Accreditation in Business Valuation) from the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, and has more than 20 years of utility property tax experience. 
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ARGUMENT 
When this Court reviews a district court's decision, it does not set aside factual findings 
"unless clearly erroneous." Idaho R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a). Furthermore, Idaho law requires that 
"regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those 
witnesses who appear personally before it." Id This Court has recognized that "[i]t is the 
province of the trial judge to weigh the conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the 
credibility of witnesses." The Senator, Inc. v. Ada County Bd o/Equalization, 138 Idaho 566, 
569,67 P.3d 45,48 (2003). Although the district court's factual findings must be supported by 
"substantial evidence," "[ e ]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would 
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven." Id 
The Commission's entire brief is devoted to its criticisms of the appraisal evidence 
submitted by PacifiCorp in support of its asserted value. With respect to the weight of the 
evidence, the district court held that "PacifiCorp has established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the estimated Idaho valuation placed on PacifiCorp's operating property ... was 
erroneous [and that] the estimated Idaho valuation proposed by PacifiCorp is correct." 
R. 00055 ~ 12. The district court also specifically addressed credibility when it found that the 
testimony and opinions ofPacifiCorp's expert witness, Mr. Tegarden, concerning the unit 
valuation ofPacifiCorp's operating property was "more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, 
and entitled to greater weight than the testimony and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax 
R. 00064 ~ 44. The resulting income indicator of $8,242,000,000 was higher than the Bureau.'s 
income indicator of$7,761,521,809. R. 00060 ~ 31 and R. 00065 ~ 47. 
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provided proof that the external obsolescence affected the value ofPacifiCorp's operating 
property. The district court evaluated five days of evidence and testimony and ultimately 
concluded that PacifiCorp's operating property suffered from additional external obsolescence. 
A. The Commission's Claim That Obsolescence Does Not Exist Must Be Rejected 
In Light Of The Commission's Own Finding Of Obsolescence. 
Idaho law requires an assessor to adjust the cost indicator for obsolescence. Idaho Admin. 
Code R. 405.05.b (1999)("The appraiser shall attempt to measure obsolescence, if any exists. If 
obsolescence is found to exist, it may be considered in the cost approach."). When PacifiCorp 
appealed its assessment to the Commission, the Commission observed that Mr. Rudd had used the 
HCLD method to determine the cost indicator and that he made no adjustment for additional 
depreciation because he believed that all obsolescence "was included in the accounting 
depreciation amount." R.00017. The Commission rejected Mr. Rudd's cost indicator, and 
allowed an additional "functional and economic (or external) obsolescence adjustment of7.93% to 
the HCLD." R. 00061 ~ 33. 
When PacifiCorp appealed the assessment to the district court for de novo review, the 
Commission's decision was the subject of the appeal. Inasmuch as the Commission had already 
rejected the Bureau's cost indicator, one would have expected the Commission to advocate a 
minor external obsolescence adjustment to the cost indicator which would have been consistent 
with its prior findings. However, the Commission completely changed its position and claimed 
that the Bureau's HCLD method now fully accounted for all depreciation and that there should be 
no adjustment for external obsolescence. Ironically, the Commission's new position was also 
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Commission considered PacifiCorp's appeal, it apparently concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to support its finding of additional obsolescence. Yet now the Commission claims that 
PacifiCorp's appraisal "should be disallowed because it merely assumes obsolescence." 
Commission's Brief, p. 4. The Commission's attempt to impose a higher standard of proof at this 
level of review than it found necessary during the Board of Equalization proceeding should be 
rejected. 
B. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Findings Regarding 
Obsolescence Experienced By PacifiCorp's Operating Property. 
The Commission claims that PacifiCorp has not provided adequate evidence to support its 
claim of external obsolescence and invites this Court to articulate a standard requiring proof of 
cause, amount, and actual effect. Commission's Brief, pp. 15-18. The suggestion that the Court 
impose the Commission's recommended standard implies that the district court evaluated 
PacifiCorp's evidence without regard to any standard of proof. In fact, the district court made 
specific findings regarding PacifiCorp's evidence ofthe cause of obsolescence as well as the 
extent to which obsolescence actually affects its operating property. 
The district court found that Mr. Tegarden identified several contributory causes to 
obsolescence and identified the primary cause of the obsolescence as governmental regulation. 
R. 00063 ~ 41. Specifically, the court found that because PacifiCorp "is not allowed ... to 
automatically include the new property in its rate base until it has filed a rate case and received an 
order from the appropriate commission authorizing inclusion of the new properties ... 
PacifiCorp's earnings are negatively affected.until and if a favorable rate increase is allowed." 
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Mr. McDougal, the Director of Revenue Requirements for PacifiCorp with more than 26 
years of electric utility regulatory experience, testified that regulation results in a delay of revenue 
increases, "especially in the power cost area where costs are higher than the amounts that we're 
allowed to recover" and explained that the timing of rate cases delays a public utility's ability to 
recover those costs when they are incurred. Tr. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 11-18. Mr. McDougal also 
identified additional causes of external obsolescence for PacifiCorp's operating property: (1) the 
regulatory requirement that PacifiCorp use historic test year data to establish future rates for 
electricity results in an under recovery of capital and costs; (2) inter-jurisdictional allocation 
procedures which result in an under recovery of both capital and operating costs; (3) absence of 
power cost mechanisms which would facilitate timely recovery of electricity generation costs 
outside formal rate case proceedings; and (4) political factors which favor or disfavor particular 
energy sources in differing states have resulted in an under recovery for invested capital. See Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 170-184 and Exhibit 19.6 In addition to identifying these causes of obsolescence, Mr. 
McDougal explained how these factors were causing an actual loss of value to PacifiCorp's 
property.7 Id Mr. McDougal also testified that PacifiCorp has been earning less than the 
weighted average cost of capital for "at least the last 10 years." Tr. Vol. III, p. 129, L. 23-24. 
6 In 2006, the Idaho State Tax Commission found that regulatory lag would "be a continuing 
contributory element in economic obsolescence" for PacifiCorp's operating properties. Ex. 31, 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 249, L. 4 - p. 251, L. 10. 
7 For example, Mr. McDougal explained that one rate case filed with the Idaho Public Utilities 
Commission was filed on May 28, 2010, using 2009 as the base period and requesting rate 
increases effective January 1, 2011. Tr. Vol. I, p. 164. In the meantime, PacifiCorp continues to 
make more investments in its property which are not included in the rate case. For example, in 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15 
reasoning in resolving each of the conflicts," but that they would identify "those material facts and 
expert opinions that have been established by credible and competent evidence." R. 00054, 10 
(emphasis in original). On the basis of the evidence identified above, the district court concluded 
that PacifiCorp's operating property was experiencing external obsolescence as a direct result of 
factors associated with rate regulation. R. 00058-59,,24-26 and R. 00063 , 41. These findings 
are supported by substantial evidence. 
There is also substantial evidence in the record supporting the district court's conclusion 
regarding the quantification of external obsolescence. Mr. Tegarden used the capitalization of 
income loss method to identify and quantify PacifiCorp's external obsolescence. The district 
court found that this was a "generally accepted" appraisal technique for measuring external 
obsolescence. R. 00062,39. The district court also observed that this was "the same method 
used by the Tax Commission in a 2006 valuation case involving PacifiCorp." Id., Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 249, L. 4 - p. 21, L. 19, Trial Exhibit 31 (2006 BOE decision). 8 
The capitalization of income loss method is based on the assumption that a willing, 
informed buyer of rate regulated utility properties will expect to earn a competitive rate of return 
on their investment. The methodology is widely approved by appraisal textbooks as well as case 
law. The Appraisal Institute, Appraisal of Real Estate, 443-444 (13th ed. 2008). An 
authoritative textbook definition of external obsolescence, quoted by Mr. Tegarden, explained that 
8 In the 2006 Decision, offered as Trial Exhibit 31 to the district court, the Commission 
"recognize[d] the presence of economic obsolescence because [PacifiCorp's] average earned rate 
of return for at least the last two years [was] substantially below its allowed rate ofretum an 
electric industry performance." Trial Ex. 31, In the matter of the 2006 Operating Property Ad 
Valorem Valuation ofPacifiCorp, Decision, No. 19561 (Sept. 7,2006). 
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"testimony and opinions [were] more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to 
greater weight than the testimony and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax Commission." 
R. 00062 ~ 37. Substantial evidence on the record established that various elements of 
government regulation are causing external obsolescence in this matter and that PacifiCorp's 
earning have been directly impacted by regulatory requirements and restrictions. 
The Commission cites to five cases for the proposition that the taxpayer must identify the 
cause of the obsolescence and then quantify the impact on the subject property: Eurofresh, Inc. v. 
Graham County, 187 P.3d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007);10 American Crystal Sugar Co. v. County of 
Polk, Nos. CI-05-574, C4-06-367, 2009 WL 2431376 (Minn. Tax Ct. Aug. 5,2009); Wal Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 825 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005); Canal Square Ltd 
10 The Commission's suggestion that Eurofresh demonstrates that PacifiCorp did not satisfy its 
burden of demonstrating external obsolescence is incorrect. In Eurofi-esh, the taxpayer used the 
market extraction method to identify obsolescence by utilizing the distress sale prices of 
greenhouses which were significantly smaller than the Eurofresh property to suggest that "the 
obsolescence evidenced by the three other greenhouse sales is market-wide and for that reason, 
must necessarily affect the value of [its] greenhouse." Id. at 535. The Court referred to 
Appraisal of Real Estate which warns that "the market extraction method should be used only 
when the comparable properties relied upon 'have incurred similar amounts and types of 
depreciation' as the subject property." Id. at 538. Thus, the Arizona court held that "[i]t is not 
sufficient ... to simply assert that a property's value should be reduced because of external 
obsolescence observed elsewhere." Id. at 538. The court refused to find obsolescence because 
"Eurofresh offered no evidence that its Willcox greenhouse suffered from the same impairment." 
The failure of Eurofresh to prove that the factors which caused obsolescence in the comparable 
properties affected its own properties proved fatal to its claim. The Eurofi-esh decision is 
inapplicable because PacifiCorp did not rely on the market extraction method to demonstrate 
obsolescence. Instead, Mr. Tegarden used the capitalization of income loss method which 
evaluates the external obsolescence experienced directly by the property, rather than attempting to 
extrapolate obsolescence experienced by other, unrelated properties based on an assumption that 
the obsolescence is market-wide. 
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expectation that this will be reduced to 3.3 months." Commission's Brief, p. 17. It also professes 
ignorance regarding "[h]ow much ofPacifiCorp's assets are not included in rate base because they 
were financed by deferred income taxes." Id. at 18. The district court's factual findings were 
based on substantial evidence provided by PacifiCorp and the Commission. 
With respect to regulatory lag, the Commission's representation of the lapse of time 
between putting assets into place and achieving a rate increase is based on Exhibit 522 which is a 
document created in 2005 outlining optimistic projections of possible reductions to the regulatory 
lag problem experienced by PacifiCorp. That document projected that PacifiCorp hoped to 
reduce regulatory lag to 6.2 months by 2009 and optimistically projected a further reduction to 3.3 
months for the following year. Not only was the document not indicative of the regulatory lag 
actually experienced by PacifiCorp during and prior to the subject year, but Mr. McDougal also 
testified that PacifiCorp was never able to achieve the expectations set forth in Exhibit 522. Ir. 
Vol. III, p. 127, L. 17-19. Furthermore, in the 2006 appeal, the Commission recognized that 
regulatory lag "will be a continuing contributory element in economic obsolescence." Ir. 
Vol. III, p. 250, L. 9 - p. 251 L. 10. The evidence of regulatory lag actually experienced by 
PacifiCorp was illustrated in the "Chronology of a Rate Case" prepared by Mr. McDougal and 
designated as Exhibit 19, Slide 7. Mr. McDougal used a recent rate case to illustrate that property 
acquired during a particular year would not be included in the rate base until at least one year (and 
as many as two years) after the property was put into operation. Ir. Vol. I, p. 164, L. 12 - p. 169, 
L. 4. Based on this testimony, the district court's found that "it ordinarily takes six to eighteen 
months after filing for a utilities commission to process and rule on a rate filing. As a result ofthis 
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Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969,973 (2003). "Additionally, this Court will not 
substitute its view ofthe facts for that of the trial court." Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,205 
P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009). All of the arguments raised by the Commission were previously 
considered and rejected by the district court. The Court dismissed those objections stating that it 
had "reviewed the criticisms ofMr. Tegarden's valuations but finds them to be unpersuasive." R. 
00066 ~ 48. 11 Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that "Mr. Tegarden's 
estimate of the value ofPacifiCorp's operating property as of January 1,2008, is the most accurate 
estimate of value in the record." R. 00066 ~ 49. The findings of the district court should not be 
disturbed. 
A. The Record Does Not Support The Commission's Claim That PacifiCorp's 
Book Depreciation Is Self-Reported And Accounts For All Obsolescence. 
The Commission's allegation that PacifiCorp's book depreciation is self-reported to the 
various state public utility commissions ("PUCs") and thus accounts for all forms of obsolescence 
is simply not supported by the trial evidence. It is inaccurate to assert that PacifiCorp 
"self-reports" because the depreciation rates are set by the PUCs, not by PacifiCorp. The 
uncontroverted testimony ofMr. McDougal established that PacifiCorp submits a proposed 
depreciation study to the various state utility commissions about every five years. Tr. Vol. I, 
11 The district court explained that it's "findings of fact will not include matters that have not been 
established by the weight of the credible evidence." R. 00054 ~ 10. Thus, the fact that each of 
the issues raised by the Commission may not be specifically addressed in the district court's 
decision, does not mean it was not fully considered. Indeed there was substantial testimony and 
evidence admitted regarding each issue raised by the Commission in objection to Mr. Tegarden's 
testimony and PacifiCorp's appraisal. "After hearing all the evidence and considering the 
applicable law," the district court concluded that "[t]he preponderance of the evidence [] 
establishes that the estimated Idaho valuation proposed by PacifiCorp is correct." R. 00055 ~ 12. 
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Commission's own witness testified that one cannot assert that regulatory reporting "precisely 
picks up every possible form of obsolescence." Tr. Vol. V, p. 15, L. 12-21. 
On the basis of the testimony and evidence before it, the district court held that "[b ]ook 
depreciation is not calculated for the purpose of estimating the true difference between original 
cost and current market value. It does not account for all forms of functional and external 
obsolescence that may affect an electric utility'S assets." R. 00060,-r 30. The overwhelming 
evidence in the record, including the Commission's own decision to adjust the cost indicator for 
additional obsolescence, supports the district court's decision. 12 
B. The Commission's Attempt To Discredit PacifiCorp's Appraisal By Claiming 
That A Company Not Earning Its Cost Of Capital Will Alwavs Operate In 
The Red Demonstrates A Fundamental Misunderstanding Of Financial 
Principles. 
In 2006, the Commission determined that PacifiCorp's operating property was 
experiencing external obsolescence because PacifiCorp's "average earned rate or return for at least 
the last two years [was] substantially below its allowed rate of return." Trial Ex. 31, p. 8. In this 
matter, the district court held that the capitalization of income loss method used by Mr. Tegarden is 
"the same method used by the Tax Commission in [the] 2006 valuation case involving 
PacifiCorp." R. 00062-63 ,-r 39. 
12 Notwithstanding the Commission's own finding of additional obsolescence, the Commission 
makes the unfortunate accusation that "PacifiCorp either filed falsely with FERC or Mr. Tegarden 
seeks to subtract obsolescence twice." Commission's Brief, p. 5. This is the first of many 
attempts to disparage Mr. Tegarden and PacifiCorp. This unprofessional name-calling is 
particularly inappropriate in this forum where the credibility of the witness is not an issue. The 
Senator, Inc., 138 Idaho 566, 67 P.3d 45,48 (2003)("It'is the province of the trial judge to weigh 
the conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses.") 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 25 
will operate in the black. Thus, the Commission's claim that a company which does not "attain its 
cost of capital ... must always operate in the red" is simply wrong. Commission's Brief, p. 7. 
The Commission also challenges Mr. Tegarden's use of the capitalization of income loss 
method to quantify the amount of obsolescence because it does not account for the "additional 
benefit" ofDIT. Commission's Brief, p. 7. According to the Commission, when this "benefit" 
is taken into account, "PacifiCorp's real cost of capital is approximately 7%, not 9.1 %." 
Commission's Brief, p. 8. This claim is based on an off-hand comment by Dr. Johnson which 
contradicts the Commission's own cost of capital calculation of 8.89% and its expert witness' 
testimony that the cost of capital was 8.72%. Commission's Brief, p. 14. When asked to explain 
. his comment that he thought the cost of capital might be in the 7% range, Dr. Johnson could not 
recall that he had made such a statement. Tr. Vol. V, p. 47, L. 22 - p. 48, L. 2. Dr. Johnson 
admitted that he had not been asked to determine cost of capital, Tr. Vol. V, p. 47 L. 17; that he had 
not performed a cost of capital study, Tr. Vol. V, p. 49, L. 5-13; and that he was not trying to 
suggest that Messrs. Rudd, Eyre and Tegarden had made a mistake in their cost of capital 
calculations. Tr. Vol. V, p. 51, L. 17-24. 
By the Commission's and Mr. Eyre's own calculations, PacifiCorp's cost of capital 
exceeds its return on investment. The capitalization of income loss method is a generally 
accepted appraisal method used to quantify the loss in earnings in terms of an obsolescence 
calculation. PacifiCorp does not claim to be operating in the red, and does not need to be in such 
dire straits in order to qualify for an obsolescence adjustment. In short, the Commission gloats 
over solving a Holmesian mystery which simply does not exist in this case. 
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assertion. In that case, Pacific Power & Light ("PPL") used the value of property purchased with 
DIT and income tax credits ("ITC") as a "surrogate for the obsolescence" and deducted the value 
of that property from its cost approach. The Court acknowledged that "regulation to some extent 
diminishes the earning potential of regulated property," but held that "[a]bsent any satisfactory 
evidence establishing an appropriate measure of obsolescence, it is inappropriate to make any 
deduction for it by "subtracting in toto the values for DIT and ITC [property]." Pacific Power, 
775 P.2d at 308. 
Unlike PPL, PacifiCorp did not simply deduct the dollar amount reported in the 
accumulated DIT account from the cost approach. The starting point for PacifiCorp's cost 
approach calculation was the historic cost of all of PacijiCorp 's property from which accounting 
depreciation was deducted (the historic cost less depreciation or "HCLD" approach). PacifiCorp 
then calculated its average net rate of return on all its plant in service and compared that to an 
"investor-market required rate of return." R. 00059 ~ 27. Because PacifiCorp's rate of return 
was 20.88% less than the market required rate of return, PacifiCorp made an adjustment of20.88% 
to the HCLD book value. R. 00063-00064, ~ 42. Unlike PPL, PacifiCorp did not use a 
"surrogate" for obsolescence by "assign[ing] zero value" to some group of properties as alleged by 
the Commission. Instead, PacifiCorp provided "satisfactory evidence establishing an appropriate 
measure of obsolescence." Id. 775 P.2d at 308. 
The district judge found that PacifiCorp is only permitted to earn a return on its rate base. 
R. 00057-58 ~ 22. It agreed that rate regulation "affects PacifiCorp's earnings," R. 00059 ~ 26, 
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I knew from my personal experience in observing the industry over the last 25,30 
years that in most transactions ... it's very clear that the buyer paid somewhere in 
the vicinity of net book value or in excess of it. ... Just a whole series of 
transactions over 20 to 30 years in my career that I have observed people are always 
paying a premium. The question is how large the premium is. 
Tr. Vol. V, p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 14. 
Pretty typical for -- with these types of transactions for most, if not all, of the 
premium to go to goodwill. ... 
Tr. Vol. V, p. 80, L. 3-5. 
[I]t is common to see the difference between the market value of the property, plant 
and equipment as a going concern and the carrying value of a net book value, to see 
that difference show up as a goodwill entry in the accounting. 
Tr. Vol. V, p. 84, L. 2-7. 
Mr. Eyre, the Commission's other expert, testified that $1.074 billion of the purchase price 
for the stock "was booked as goodwill [as] a premium paid for the stock." Tr. Vol. III, p. 38, 
L. 12-15. He also testified that he did not remove the goodwill from his value indicators. Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 39, L. 25 - p. 40, L. 12. The district court rejected Mr. Eyre's use of the stock and debt 
approach "in view ofthe facts that PacifiCorp does not have publicly traded stock, and the price of 
its sale to a subsidiary ofMEHC in 2006 included a significant amount of goodwill." R. 00065 
~ 45. 
The Commission's objection to PacifiCorp's appraisal because it does not factor in the 
2006 sale ofPacifiCorp to MEHC also ignores the fact that its own witness, Mr. Rudd, "did not use 
[the stock and debt] approach because of the difficulty in arriving at accurate assumptions and 
estimations." R. 00065 ~ 45. 
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The district court found that Mr. Tegarden's testimony was the most credible and observed that, in 
his opinion, "the income approach resulted in a far more accurate estimate of valuation than the 
HCLD approach." R. 00066 ~ 47. 15 The Commission's persistent accusations of dishonesty, 
manipulation, and deceit are unprofessional as well as legally improper. The credibility ofMr. 
Tegarden is simply not an issue for the appellate court. The Senator, Inc., 138 Idaho at 569,67 
P.3d at 48 (2003). 
F. The Capitalization Of Income Loss Method Does Not Reduce The Cost 
Approach To The Income Approach. 
The Commission argues that the capitalization of income loss approach reduces the cost 
approach to an income approach. 16 This criticism ignores the fact that Idaho law requires an 
assessor to consider economic or external obsolescence. Idaho Admin. Code R. 405.05.b (1999) 
("The appraiser shall attempt to measure obsolescence, if any exists. If obsolescence is found to 
exist, it may be considered in the cost approach.") In the commercial context, "loss of value 
usually means a decrease in the property's income-generating ability." Hometowne Associates, 
839 N.E.2d at 274. Thus, external obsolescence is properly quantified by examining property's 
income-generating ability. Inasmuch as Idaho law requires an adjustment to the cost indicator for 
15 What makes the Commission's accusations even more troubling is that the Commission ignores 
the fact that the income indicator used by Mr. Tegarden was nearly half a billion dollars higher 
than the income indicator used by Mr. Rudd. See note 2, supra. If PacifiCorp and its witnesses 
were truly acting "surreptitiously," they would not be asserting a higher income indicator than that 
asserted by the Commission. 
16 The Commission states that PacifiCorp's appraisal "uses 'obsolescence in the air' to reduce the 
cost approach to the income approach." Commission's Brief, p. 12. The phrase "obsolescence 
in the air" is not defined and PacifiCorp is not entirely sure of what the Commission is trying to 
suggest by that phrase. 
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Dr. lohnson, in his report (Trial Ex. 533) acknowledged the relationship between income 
information and obsolescence determinations when he stated: 
Assuming economic obsolescence exists, it may be quantified by comparing the 
value of the property as it currently exists with what the value would be assuming 
the conditions causing the obsolescence were not present. In practice one way of 
estimating the impact of economic obsolescence is to compare the income 
produced by the subject property with the income which would be expected in the 
absence of the conditions which cause the obsolescence and capitalizing the 
difference. 
Tr. Vol. V, p. 18, L. 25 - p. 19, L. 10. Finally, in its decision in the 2006 PacifiCorp appeal, the 
Commission recognized that under earning was indicative of obsolescence and determined that the 
cost approach should be adjusted to account for economic obsolescence. Trial Ex. 31, p. 8. 
The Commission's disavowal of its witnesses' testimony and prior practice is insufficient 
to refute the substantial evidence which supports the district court's determination that the 
capitalization of income loss method is accepted appraisal methodology. See discussion supra at 
Section 1.B. 18 
18 The Commission's reference to the United Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Rev., 770 P.2d 43 (Or. 1989) is 
also unavailing. The Commission suggests that this matter and United Tel. are similar because, in 
both cases, the taxpayer's appraiser started with HCLD and "then subtracted ... a figure for 
obsolescence." Commission's Brief, p. 12. The fundamental difference between that case and 
PacifiCorp's is that, unlike Mr. Davis, Mr. Tegarden did not use a calculation which 
mathematically converted the cost approach to the income approach. That distinction should be 
readily apparent from the fact that Mr. Tegarden's adjustment to the HCLD approach resulted in a 
cost indicator which exceeded the income indicator by more than half a billion dollars. 
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H. Subjectivity In The Appraisal Process Is Not A Meaningful Objection To 
PacifiCorp's Obsolescence Calculations. 
The Commission's final criticism ofPacifiCorp's appraisal is its claim that the 
capitalization of income loss methodology is "too subjective" because any change in one of the 
factors utilized could have a substantial impact on the resulting obsolescence estimate. 
Commission's Brief, pp. 14-15. Subjectivity in appraisal practice is precisely the reason why 
parties with opposing viewpoints present extensive evidence and testimony by expert witnesses to 
support their respective positions. The district court addressed this very fact and found that 
"[ d]ifferences of opinion do not mean that any of the witnesses was being deliberately untruthful. 
Contradictory versions of facts and opinions in the presentation of testimony often result ... 
especially from honest differences of expert opinion." R. 00054 ~ 11. Mr. Eyre, the 
Commission's own witness, likewise testified that "almost all of the appraisal indicators have 
large amounts of subjectivity and that's what creates the controversy." Tr. Vol. III, p. 49, 
L. 15-18. 
The fact that the experts differed in their opinions regarding the weighted average cost of 
capital does not mean that the methodology is "too subjective." The differences in opinion are 
precisely why the judge has the "special opportunity ... to judge the credibility of those witnesses 
who appear personally before it." Idaho R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a). The Commission's witnesses 
presented two different opinions regarding the appropriate weighted average cost of capital. The 
Commission's estimate was 8.89%, Mr. Eyre's was 8.72%, Commission's Brief, p. 14. 
Commission's Brief, p. 8. In contrast, PacifiCorp stood by a single cost of capital estimate of 
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CONCLUSION 
The Commission claims that Pacifi Corp did not meet its burden of proof because it relied 
on an allegedly flawed appraisal. Commission's Brief, pp. 18_19. 19 The district court reviewed 
the appraisal and all of the testimony proffered by a variety of experts over the course of five days. 
The trial court is unequivocal in its conclusion that Mr. Tegarden's testimony and opinions were 
"more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to greater weight than the testimony 
and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax Commission." R. 00062 ~ 37. The Commission has 
failed to offer the level of evidence required to demonstrate clear error in the district court's factual 
findings. Kennedy, 151 Idaho 440, 259 P.3d 586 (2011) citing Hodgins, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 
P.3d 969,973 (2003)("Where findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be disturbed by this 
Court.")( emphasis added). 
The district court evaluated all of the evidence and concluded that PacifiCorp's estimate 
value was "the most accurate estimate of value in the record." R. 00066 ~ 49. The Court 
specifically found that PacifiCorp had proven error in the original assessment when it stated, 
"Implicit in this conclusion is the additional conclusion that the estimate of value of 
$8,877,075,014.99 in the Tax Commission's decision necessarily is erroneous." Id. For all of 
the reasons stated above, this Court should find that substantial evidence supports the district 
court's factual findings and affirm the ruling of the district court. 
19 The Commission's claim that PacifiCorp has not met its burden of proof is a basic restatement 
of the Commission's main argument challenging the district court's factual findings. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 39 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Z~~ay of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was mailed in the U.S. mail or UPS, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Clerk of the Court (via Overnight UPS) 
Supreme Court Building 
PO Box 83720 
Boise,ID 83720-2210 
Carl E. Olsson (via us. Mail) 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
800 Park Blvd., Plaza IV 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, ID 83722-0410 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 41 
ADDENDUM 1 
NO. __ ~;:-;;;::-___ _ 
AM Fl~. 3.' ¥? 
~ 6 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS'lm ~'r~ 














STATE OF IDAHO, 
RESPONDENT. 
CASE NO CV 0818158 
MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
This is an action seeking judicial review or appeal of a decision by the Idaho 
Tax Commission concerning assessed valuation of operating property of PacifiCorp 
for property tax purposes. The matter was presented to the court in a trial de novo 
starting on July 12, 20010, and concluding on July 19,2010. PacifiCorp was· 
represen.ted by David J. Crapo and Richard J. Armstrong. The State was 
represented by Lawrence G. Allen and Erick M. Shaner. The parties submitted 
post-trial memoranda on August 9, 2010. The court, being fully advised, enters the 
following memorandum of findings offact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In this case, the attorneys have been such a pleasure to work with that I probably would 
not have been disappointed if the case had continued for several more days. Thank you all for the 
professional, competent, and courteous manner in which you conducted the trial. 
2. This memorandum constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
PACIFICORP DECISION 1 
7. Based on the 2003 amendments to I.C. § 63-409(2) and based on the court's 
memorandum and order entered on June 28, 2010, the court will not apply the old 
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence and will not require a showing 
that the decision of the Tax Commission was manifestly excessive, arbitrary and 
capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive. Instead, the court will apply the 
preponderance of evidence burden of proof and will require only that PacifiCorp 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision of the tax commission 
was erroneous. 
8. An appeal from an assessment of valuation of operating property is to be 
heard as a trial de novo without a jury and "in the same manner as though it were 
an original proceeding .... " I.C. § 63-409(1). Trial de novo means "a trying of the 
matter anew-the same as if it had never been heard before." Gilbert v. Moore, 108 
Idaho 165,168,697 P.2d 1179 (1985); Canyon County Board of Equalization v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Company, LLC, 143 Idaho 58, 61, 137 P.3d 445 (2006). Thus, 
while the decision of the Idaho Tax Commission forms the basis of the appeal, the 
record of the commission hearing is not examined for error in the traditional sense; 
in fact the record is not before the de novo court. Rather, the court hears the case as 
a new hearing or as a hearing for a second time. In many respects it hears the case 
as a court of original rather than appellate jurisdiction. Compare, Beker Industries, 
Inc. v. Georgetown Irrigation District, 101 Idaho 187, 190, 610 P.2d 546 (1980). The 
de novo trial court's decision, nevertheless, must include an implicit determination 
PACIFICORP DECISION 3 
10. The findings of fact will not include matters that have not been 
established by the weight of the credible evidence. In keeping with the spirit of Rule 
52(a), the court's findings will not restate every item of documentary evidence or 
every item of testimony or every expert opinion. The findings will not contain a 
recitation of conflicts in the evidence or the court's reasoning in resolving each of 
the conflicts. The findings will consist only of a recitation of those material facts and 
expert opinions that have been established by credible and competent evidence to be 
more probably true than not true and that bear on the issues that legally may be 
addressed. 
11. This case in many respects was a battle of the experts. The expert 
opinions derived from the evidence were contradictory. This is not surprising, 
considering that there is very little science but a great deal of art in valuing 
property. Differences of opinion do not mean that any of the witnesses was being 
deliberately untruthful. Contradictory versions of facts and opinions in the 
presentation of testimony often result from differing recollections of events, from 
failures to communicate accurately what one means to say, and especially from 
honest differences of expert opinion. With that in mind the following is what the 
court believes to be the facts, as established by a preponderance of the evidence and 
the applicable law. 
12. Each side has 'presented the court with proposed findings of fact and 
PACIFICORP DECISION 5 
14. Pursuant to Idaho law, the real and personal property PacifiCorp uses in 
its electric utility operations is designated as "operating property." Idaho Code § 
63-201(16). PacifiCorp also has non-operating property. 
15. The operating property located in Idaho is subject to assessment by the 
Tax Commission, and the Commission is required to determine the market value of 
the operating property annually as of January 1st of each year. I.C. §§ 63-204, 205, 
207,405. Non-operating property is not valued by the Tax Commission. 
16. ""Market value" means the amount of United States dollars or the 
equivalent for which, in all probability, a property would exchange hands between a 
willing seller, under no compulsion to sell, and an informed, capable buyer, with a 
reasonable time allowed to consummate the sale, substantiated by a reasonable 
down or full cash payment." I.C. § 63-201(15). 
17. The unit method of valuation is preferred for valuing a public utility such 
as PacifiCorp. The three traditional approaches to property value -- the cost 
approach, the income approach, and the market approach -- may be used. For 
interstate property, allocation factors must be used to determine the part of the unit 
or system value attributable to Idaho. 
18. The appraisal procedures to be used are those procedures, methods, and 
techniques accepted by nationally recognized appraisal and valuation 
organizations. In using the cost approach, obsolescence, if any should be measured 
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electricity by determining a revenue requirement for the company that should 
provide it with the opportunity to recover its operating costs and earn a reasonable 
market return on its invested capital- the rate base. The revenue requirement 
equals expenses plus the product of the rate base times the rate of return 
(Revenue Requirement = Expenses + (Rate Base x Rate of Return)). 
23. Once PacifiCorp's revenue requirement has been determined by a state 
public utilities commission, PacifiCorp usually is not allowed to adjust the rates it 
charges until a new rate case is filed with the particular commission, and the 
commission issues an order modifying the revenue requirement. 
24. PacifiCorp has made significant investments in its property, plant, and 
equipment in the years preceding January 1, 2008. It is not allowed, however, to 
automatically include the new property in its rate base until it has filed a rate case 
and received an order from the appropriate commission authorizing inclusion of the 
new properties. Likewise if operating costs increase PacifiCorp usually cannot 
recover the increased expenses until it has filed a rate case and received 
authorization from the appropriate commission. 
25. PacifiCorp has filed rate cases during the past several years to include 
newly acquired property and increased expenses in its rates. However, it ordinarily 
takes six to eighteen months after filing for a utilities commission to process and 
rule on a rate filing. As a result of this regulatory lag, PacifiCorp's earnings are 
negatively affected until and if a favorable rate increase is allowed. 
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diminution in value due to negative influences outside the property, such as 
regulation, regulatory lag, political considerations, and changes in demand. 
30. Book depreciation is not calculated for the purpose of estimating the true 
difference between original cost and current market value. It does not account for 
all forms of functional and external obsolescence that may affect an electric utility's 
assets. 
31. On June 16, 2008, the Property Tax Bureau ofthe Tax Commission 
issued its 2008 appraisal report, prepared by Jerott Rudd, for PacifiCorp. The report 
found that the indicators of value of the operating property to be 
$11,122,536,280.00, using a type of cost approach known as historic cost less 
depreciation (HOLD), and $7,761,521,809.00, using a type of income approach 
known as yield capitalization of net operating income (NOI). Mr. Rudd did not use 
any type of market approach. He applied 45% weight to the HOLD approach and 
55% weight to the NOI approach, resulting in a unit or system value of 
$9,273,982,721.00. He reduced this amount by $240,761,350.00 for the value of non-
taxable intangible property. He multiplied the result by the Idaho allocation factor 
of 3.745822% to obtain an Idaho allocated value of $338,368,433.00. Additional 
adjustments for various deductions and exemptions of $74,701,191.00 resulted in a 
final estimated Idaho valuation of $263,667,243.00. 
32. PacifiOorp protested and received a hearing before the Tax Commission. 
PacifiOorp argued that the assessment was erroneous, because it failed to account 
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a retired appraiser and auditor for the Utah State Tax Commission, who ordinarily 
testifies on behalf oft axing authorities. The Tax Commission also utilized Dr. Ben 
Johnson, a consulting economist and president of Ben Johnson Associates, Inc. 
37. Each of the witnesses has considerable experience in his particular field. 
Nevertheless, having had the special opportunity of listening to each witness as he 
gave live testimony and was subjected to rigorous cross examination, the court was 
especially impressed by Mr. Tegarden and found his testimony and opinions to be 
more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to greater weight than 
the testimony and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax Commission. 
38. Mr. Tegarden researched, inyestigated, prepared, and testified to an 
analysis of the unit valuation of PacifiCorp's operating property. His testimony 
concerning his methodology and opinions is illustrated in Petitioner's Exhibit 20. 
He used the same valuation models employed by Mr. Rudd and the Tax 
Commission: the HOLD historical cost less depreciation approach and the yield 
capitalization income approach. As with Mr. Rudd but unlike Mr. Eyre, he did not 
use any type of market approach and felt that a market analysis, whether by way of 
comparable sales or by way of a stock and debt approach, was not useful as an 
indicator in attempting to value PacifiCorp's operating property. 
39. Turning to the HCLD cost approach to valuation, generally accepted 
appraisal principles state that an appraiser may use one or more of three methods 
of measuring external or economic obsolescence: (1) allocation of market-extracted 
depreciation; (2) analysis of market data; and (3) capitalization of income loss. Mr. 
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property. In PacifiCorp's case the net operating income over the immediately 
preceding five-year period was approximately 7.2%, while the net operating income 
for PacifiCorp's peer group (that is, the expected or allowed market rate of return of 
net operating income) was 9.1%, resulting in the previously noted 20.88% negative 
difference between PacifiCorp's rate of return and the market rate of return. 
Treating this as a measure of external or economic obsolescence resulted in 
, 
additional depreciation of $2,325, 180,010.00 and reduced the cost indicator of value 
to $8,810,739,577.00 ($11,135,919,587 - $2,325,180,010.00 = $8,810,739,577.00). 
Mr. Tegarden rounded his cost indicator of value to $8,811,000,000.00. 
43. Turning to the income approach to valuation, Mr. Tegarden used the yield 
capitalization income approach to obtaining an indicator of value , as did Mr. Rudd, 
albeit with a different result. In its simplest terms, the income approach involves a 
determination of value based upon cash flow divided by a capitalization rate -
growth. Mr. Rudd estimated cash flow to be around $690,000,000.00 and the 
capitalization rate to be 8.89% resulting in a valuation estimate of 
$7,761,529,809.00. Mr. Tegarden estimated cash flow to be around 
$750,000,000.00 and the capitalization rate to be around 9.10% resulting a in a 
valuation estimate of $8,242,000,000.00. 
44. Mr. Tegarden estimated a larger cash flow than Mr. Rudd, because he 
attempted to account for future earnings to be derived from rate changes allowed 
prior to the valuation date and future earnings to be anticipated as a result of 
construction in progress. Mr. Tegarden's capitalization rate was larger than Mr. 
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$8,350,000,000.00 (19% x $8,811,000,000.00[cost approach] + 81% x 
$8,242,000,000.00 [income approach] = $8,350,110,000.00). As noted, the allocation 
was based on his opinion that the income approach resulted in a far more accurate 
estimate of valuation than the HCLD approach. 
48. The court has reviewed the criticisms of Mr. Tegarden's valuations but 
finds them to be unpersuasive 
49. After evaluating all the evidence the court concludes that Mr. Tegarden's 
estimate of the value ofPacifiCorp's operating property as of January 1, 2008, is the 
most accurate estimate of value in the record. Implicit in this conclusion is the 
additional conclusion that the estimate of value of $8,877,075,014.00 in the Tax 
Commission's decision necessarily is erroneous. 
50. Mr. Tegarden applied the same Idaho allocation factor of 3.745822% 
used by the Tax commission and the same adjustments and exemptions used by the 
Tax Commission to arrive at a net estimated Idaho value for PacifiCorp's operating 
property of $230,680,003.00 as of January 1, 2008. Calculations of the adjustments, 
exemptions, and Idaho allocation factor do not appear to be in dispute. 
51. Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that the order of the 
Tax Commission was erroneous and that the case should be remanded to the Tax 
Commission to re-set the value of PacifiCorp's Idaho operating property at 
$230,680,003.00 as of the January 1, 2008 assessment date. 
52. The court has no information on the amount of any tax refund owed to 
PacifiCorp because of the erroneous valuation. 
PACIFICORP DECISION 17 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of September 2010, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the within instrument to: 
RICHARD J ARMSTRONG 
DAVID J CRAPO 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY VT AH 84111 
LAWRENCE G. ALLEN 
ERICK M. SHANER 
DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PO BOX 36 
BOISE, ID 83722-0410 
PACIFICORP DECISION 19 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:~d~ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
